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HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENTS, COORDINATION, AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE US 
BANKING INDUSTRY, 1896-2001 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Large-scale organizations are a ubiquitous element of modern society, yet few theories have been 
advanced to explain why they have come to dominate a wide variety of industries.   I develop a theory 
that suggests that organizational growth and scale are contingent on intra-organizational coordination 
fostered by features of the twentieth-century business environment.  I specifically examine how changes 
in laws and developments in technology influenced coordination capabilities, organizational growth, and 
acquisitions in the US banking industry.   I analyze bank growth in the twentieth century at two levels 
during two key historical eras.  At the state level between 1896 and 1978 I show that in states in which 
branching was legally permitted and the technical environment was more advanced banks were larger and 
more geographically dispersed than were banks in states that did not exhibit these characteristics.  I 
further show that banks founded under these conditions were more likely to pursue acquisitions following 
the deregulation of the banking industry in 1978.  These findings suggest that banks founded in 
environments where coordination over distance was possible developed a capability that proved to be an 
enduring advantage and that the current structure of the banking industry reflects the variation in the 
historical environments in which banks were founded. 
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HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENTS, COORDINATION, AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE US 
BANKING INDUSTRY, 1896-2001 
 
Previous work on the rise of large industrial organizations in the United States suggests that the ability to 
coordinate across units is a precondition of growth.  In his groundbreaking work on the development of 
US industrial firms, Chandler (1977) analyzed how changes in technical environments gave rise to 
managerial hierarchies.  In particular, Chandler emphasized how the development of rail, the steam 
engine, telegraph, and cable enabled production and distribution to be organized within the same firm 
resulting in the large-scale industrial organizations that emerged in the early twentieth century.  Others 
suggest political and legal bases for the rise of large firms, for example, changes in property laws that 
enabled new forms of management and organization (Roy 1997).  Although at odds on specifics, both 
arguments view the rise of large industrial hierarchies to have been set in motion by changes in the 
environments of organizations.  These external factors were, however, largely specific to the industrial 
firms that dominated the economic landscape for the first half of the twentieth century.  Technological 
advances facilitated the connection of production and distribution and legal changes the raising of capital 
needed to finance and organize manufacturing.  The second half of the twentieth century was increasingly 
dominated by large-scale service organizations, the growth of which, I argue, was contingent on quite 
different environmental factors, in particular, laws that enabled organizations to establish multiple 
locations (Ingram and Rao 2004) and technology that supported effective coordination of those locations 
with companies’ headquarters.   
In this paper I examine how changes in legal and technical environments influenced the 
transformation of US banking.  The banking industry is ideal for illuminating how environments 
influence coordination and growth in service industries.  First, the size of firms in this industry has 
increased dramatically.  At the turn of the twentieth century 99% of the more than 12,000 commercial 
banking firms in the United States were single unit operations.  A century later approximately 6,500 
organizations operate more than 80,000 separate units.  Second, banking has been characterized by strong 
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institutional, legal, and technical pressures (Scott 1998) that might have particular relevance for how scale 
developed in this industry.  State and federal laws enacted in the twentieth century (Ingram and Rao 2004) 
limited the ability of service industries, including banks, to grow by controlling expansion within and 
between states.  But to the extent that they might be contingent on the extant technical environment, the 
consequence of these laws might not be uniform across time.  Banks and other service firms differ from 
more frequently studied manufacturing firms in that the primary form of intra-organizational 
interdependence is pooled (Nadler and Tushman 1997), necessitating a different form of coordination 
than is employed  by manufacturing firms (Thompson 1967).  Under pooled interdependence each 
organizational part renders a discrete contribution to and is supported by the whole.  Thus, growth and 
organizational scale are a function not of connecting production and distribution sequentially (Chandler 
1977) but of a central office’s ability to quickly and effectively coordinate among geographically 
dispersed satellite locations.   
To understand how the environments about which I theorize influence coordination and 
organizational scale in the banking industry I examine bank size and geographic spread of branch 
locations for the contiguous US states from 1896-1978.  This period is important because until 1978 
banks’ retail locations were limited to the state in which they were headquartered, so there were in effect 
48 different banking systems within the area studied.  During this time the legal environments in which 
banks operated varied considerably across states as well as through time, particularly in the degree to 
which banks were permitted to establish multiple locations within a state.  Significant technological 
advances made during the twentieth century might also have influenced banks’ ability to grow.  I argue, 
that banking being a paper-intensive industry that requires frequent transport of documents between 
headquarters and outlying locations, the development of roadways was important to inter-unit 
coordination and, therefore, to organizational growth.  Historical differences in states’ legal environments 
and the evolution of the technical landscape over the course of the twentieth century provide a natural 
laboratory in which to study the influence of these factors on scale in an important service industry.   
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A second component of my theory connecting historical environments, coordination, and 
organizational growth draws on Stinchcombe’s (1965) insight that founding environments have an 
enduring influence on organizations.  Others (Carroll et. al. 1996; Haveman 1992) have observed that 
organizational capabilities developed by a firm during one era can be a source of advantage in a future 
era.  If particular legal and technical environments foster the development of a capacity for coordination, 
then organizations founded in those environments should subsequently be more likely to engage in 
activities such as acquisitions that require coordination capability.  Subsequent to legislation passed in 
1978 that encouraged industry consolidation through acquisition the size of banking organizations has 
increased dramatically, and work in economics attributes this organizational growth entirely to 
acquisitions (Stiroh and Poole 2000).  For evidence that firms founded under circumstances likely to 
foster the development of structures and cultures supportive of inter-unit coordination will be more likely 
to subsequently pursue acquisitions, I examine how differences in banks’ contemporary and founding 
environments influenced their acquisition behavior between 1978 and 2001.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Environments, Coordination, and Organizational Growth   
The effect of external environments on organizational coordination has been a focus of both 
theoretical (Thompson 1967) and empirical investigations (Chandler 1977).  Uncertainty occasioned by 
the external environment (Galbraith 1973) has been found to constrain both performance (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967) and the delineation of organizational boundaries (Williamson 1975).  Chandler describes 
how fundamental technical advances around the turn of the twentieth century enabled production and 
distribution activities to be effectively organized within a single firm.  The resulting administrative 
coordination gave rise to large bureaucratic organizations in America.  Roy’s (1997) explanation of this 
process emphasizes how changes in the political and legal environments, by dispersing ownership, 
enabled firms to finance large-scale manufacturing enterprises.   
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The effects of changes in the legal and technical environments on organizational scale were 
investigated mainly in manufacturing in which intra-organizational activities are highly interdependent.  
Thompson (1967:54) described three fundamental types of interdependence: pooled interdependence, 
whereby “each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole” (e.g., 
branches of an organization that do not have any direct connection); sequential interdependence, whereby 
X must act before Y can act (e.g., a sub-unit that produces parts for an assembly line); and reciprocal 
interdependence, whereby each unit’s outputs become inputs to, and thus pose contingencies for, the other 
units (e.g., an organization with both operations and maintenance functions).  I argue that to understand 
growth and scale one must first understand the primary type of interdependency, associated coordination 
needs, and environmental conditions that enable coordination in the target organization or industry.  Put 
simply, organizational growth is dependent on coordination and the ability to coordinate on features in the 
external environment.  The first step towards understanding growth in organizations and industries is thus 
to understand the environmental factors that enable coordination.   
For the manufacturing firms examined by Chandler, the core activities of which were fabricating 
and distributing finished products assembled from myriad inputs, the key to creating large organizations 
was sequential coordination among production units.   Automobile manufacture, for example, involves 
gathering and sequentially assembling the requisite materials and shipping finished vehicles to retail 
outlets.   Technological environments that facilitated the importing of raw materials and shipping of 
finished goods fostered organizational growth.  Legal changes in the way capital is raised enabled the 
substantial capital investment needed to create large, integrated manufacturing plants (Roy 1997).  But 
whereas industrial firms dominated the first half of the twentieth century, their role in the American 
economy has since declined, their output presently accounting for less than 25% of US GDP.  Service 
firms now account for approximately 75% of US GDP; however there has not been equal attention to 
their rise and to the environmental factors and changes that were important for the growth of service 
firms.   
11536 
 
 5
Pooled interdependence is most fundamental to understanding the growth of service organizations 
such as banks, which involves extending access to consumers through geographically dispersed retail 
outlets that are not dependent on one another and interact primarily with headquarters (Thompson 1967; 
Nadler and Tushman 1997).  To achieve scale in service industries in which the primary interdependency 
constraint is pooled it is necessary that (1) organizations be able to establish geographically dispersed 
locations to serve new customers (this is acknowledged in Chandler’s (1977: 472) observation that banks 
“like the marketing firms…found that they could make more intensive use of their central office facilities 
and reach more customers by setting up geographically dispersed outlets”), and (2) appropriate 
technology be sufficiently advanced to support effective coordination between headquarters and branches.  
Below, I analyze how legal and technical environments impose limits on coordination and organizational 
growth in service firms and banks.   
  
Legal Environments and Organizational Growth in US Banking during the Period of Intra-State 
Competition (1896-1978)  
For much of US history and well into the twentieth century the US government has regulated 
major industries including banking, transportation, communication, utilities, health care, and agriculture 
(Wholey and Sanchez 1991; Lounsbury, Hirsch, and Klinkerman 1998).  Research in the institutional 
tradition that has examined these laws and organizations constitutes one of the most productive areas of 
organizational sociology.  Investigators have assessed how public policy influences organizational 
structures, strategies, and competitive conditions (e.g., Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997; Dobbin and Dowd 
1997), and law has been categorized as having coercive (e.g. Fligstein 1990) and normative (e.g., 
Edelman 1990; Sutton, et al. 1994) influences.  Fligstein (1990), for example, explained how the 
prohibition of vertical mergers increased cross-industry acquisition activity, Edelman (1990) how the 
legal environment disposed organizations to adopt different organizational structures following the 
passage of civil rights legislation, and Campbell and Lindberg (1990) the importance of the US states as 
economic actors and their role in the development of regionally distinct economies.  Taking advantage of 
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the US federalist system of limited power and jurisdiction of federal bodies with an independent 
regulatory role for states, investigators have also looked within (Dobbin and Dowd, 2000; Haveman and 
Rao, 1997) and across (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001; Wade, Swaminathan and Saxon, 1998) US states.   
Previous work has examined how legal environments can constrain organizations and economic 
activity.  Clearly, coercive laws such as those that prohibit vertical integration might limit or change 
firms’ growth strategies (Fligstein 1990), but there can be less direct effects as well.  North’s (1981) 
analysis of the rise of major trading powers in early modern Europe, for example, attributed the success of 
Dutch and English and decline of Spanish and French organizations and economies to the relative 
restrictiveness of property rights.  The mechanism North uses to connect state policy to economic 
outcomes is higher transaction costs resulting from less efficient laws.  Economic analyses of banking 
associate greater regulatory constraint with organizational and statewide inefficiencies (Wheelock and 
Wilson 2002; Jayaratne and Strahan 1996).  Organizational costs of state regulation are also shown by 
Barnett and Carroll’s (1993) discussion of the effects of fragmentation of state authority on the number of 
telephone companies operating in United States during the early twentieth century:  the larger the number 
of political units, they found, the greater the number of telephone companies.  More regulation, according 
to Barnett and Carroll, begat more constraints, which, in turn, begat more and smaller companies.  This 
and other work on laws and economic growth suggests that inefficiencies occasioned by restrictive legal 
environments constrain organizational growth and size.  
Because efficient industrial production requires significant investments in both capital equipment 
and workplaces in which large numbers of employees can be easily supervised, Roy (1997) argued that 
legal changes that enabled the diffusion of ownership were most critical for capital-intensive industries 
such as manufacturing. But in service industries growth more often is achieved by establishing 
geographically dispersed retail outlets.  During much of the twentieth century the practice of establishing 
multiple business locations was for many service industries legally constrained by tax laws, as 
documented by Ingram and Rao (2004) who report that during the 1920s and 1930s more than half of US 
states passed anti-chain-store legislation that as late as 1970 still remained on the books in 13 states.  
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More recently, anti-chain-store legislation has been enacted by communities and municipalities, most 
notably in California, to protect local businesses (Hampton 2004).  Being predicated on establishing new 
outlets, the growth of service firms is directly constrained by legal environments that prohibit or restrict 
the ability to do so.   
Significant variation in the scale of banks throughout the United States resulted from pronounced 
cross-state differences in laws restricting the ability to establish multiple locations.  Banking was for 
much of its history heavily regulated at the federal and state levels (Roe 1994).   Legal environments at 
the state level variously permitted: unit banking, whereby banks are permitted to operate in only a single 
location (precludes branches); statewide banking, whereby banks are permitted to operate branches 
throughout the state; and limited statewide banking, which permits only limited operation of branches. A 
transformation of states’ legal environments during the twentieth century saw the number of unit banking 
states fall and number of branch banking states increase dramatically.  By 2001 every state except Iowa 
permitted unlimited statewide banking.  Figure 1 plots the distribution of these laws throughout the 
twentieth century.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
The importance of these regulations to the development of scale in the banking industry is 
reflected in debate that has a parallel in the movement-countermovement dynamics observed by Ingram 
and Rao (2004) with respect to laws governing retail chains.  Economists have long advocated liberal 
branching based mostly on the assumption that more units spread across a greater area can more 
efficiently share costs and branching diversifies risk across different economic environments (e.g. see 
Sprague 1903 for an early discussion of these issues).   Liberal laws were also supported by larger and 
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urban banks and manufacturers, with smaller banks, small businesses, and farmers arguing for legal 
limitations on the size of banks.1   
Until inter-state banking was permitted in 1978, banks could operate only within the state in 
which they were headquartered. Each state’s branching environment determined the scale of the 
organizations that operated therein.  Cross-state variation in the extent of branching permitted should be 
reflected in a wide range of bank sizes across the United States during this period.  In general, the theory 
advanced above suggests that states that have historically had less constraining regulations should have 
larger banks.   
• Hypothesis 1(a): In the period before inter-state banking was possible (1896-1978), states with no 
restriction on statewide banking should have larger banking companies on average. 
 
• Hypothesis 1(b): In the period before inter-state banking was possible (1896-1978), states that 
restricted banking to only one office should have smaller banking companies on average.  
 
Technical Environments and Organizational Growth in US Banking during the Period of Intra-
State Competition (1896-1978) 
The technological developments Chandler (1977) credits with enabling modern mass production 
and distribution–railroad, telegraph, steamship, and cable–were not as significant for service industries for 
which production and distribution were not central concerns.  I argue below that bank expansion, because 
it relied on pooled interdependence between headquarters and branches and frequent and voluminous 
exchanges of paper, hinged on the development of transportation technology, in particular, the roadway 
infrastructure in the United States.  
Others have maintained that bank coordination and growth is contingent on the capacity of 
technical environments to facilitate the management of geographically dispersed personnel.  Both 
                                                 
1 I have included control variables suggested by the work of Ingram and Rao (2004) and economic work on banks’ 
influencing law (e.g. Abrams and Settle 1993; Calomiris 1993; Kane 1996; White 1984) to reflect the major forces 
on both sides of this debate.   
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Southworth (1928) and Robertson (1968) point out that the First and Second Banks of the United States, 
established as central banks in the early years of the country, although organized as multi-bank companies 
were operated more as independent subsidiaries than branches of a central organization.  “In a time of 
slow communication and transportation,” observed Robertson (1968:28), “it was impossible for a head 
office to exercise day-to-day supervision over a network of branches.”  Thus, despite the formal 
organizational structure being a multi-unit hierarchy, owing to communication and transportation 
constraints the individual units operated independently of the headquarters.   
Early historical descriptions of Bank of America’s branch system suggest that the distances 
between branches led the bank to operate more like a confederation than a “well-knit, smoothly running, 
uniform organization” (James and James 1954:96).  These accounts suggest that to supervise and 
coordinate units that are at a distance poses significant challenges that might be met by advances in 
transportation technology.  Frequent transfer of documents from branches to headquarters and 
headquarters’ inspection of branches, in particular, needed to be facilitated.  Chapman and Westerfield 
(1942) in a treatise on management of branch banking organizations describe a range of paper systems 
banks used to monitor branch activities that included duplicate records and daily reports as well as 
documentation of personnel, financial statements, and general business conditions.  All had to be 
physically transported from outlying locations to headquarters.  In the manner of the “inspectors” and 
“road men” observed by Chandler (1977) to be important to the administration of geographically 
dispersed chain stores, banks often employed traveling staffs of auditors to monitor branch locations.  A 
history of Comerica Bank (Comerica 1999:19-20) records that: “Auditors, known as the ‘eyes and ears of 
management,’ traveled to all locations to check accounts and records.”   
Transportation technology was also a necessary adjunct to conduct the fundamental business of 
banking, taking in deposits and then lending them out, over a geographically dispersed area, as reflected 
in the following quote by an early head of the Rothschild banking empire. “Banking consists entirely of 
facilitating the movement of money from Point A, where it is, to Point B, where it is needed” (Ferguson 
1998:1).  While a bank that takes deposits in Cleveland may want to be able to loan that money to 
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customers in Cincinnati, for most of US history, this was not possible without an efficient way of 
transporting funds, in the form of currency, draft or gold.  Such movement requires coordination between 
central offices, outlying locations, and the Federal Reserve. An early description of credit management 
for branch banks describes physical systems and processes in place to manage geographically dispersed 
credit (Whipple, 1935).  To accomplish the matching of loans and deposits, banks had “transit 
departments” which were “the critical point in banking where what goes out is reconciled with what 
comes in.” (Covington and Ellis, 1993:58).  As a result, Chapman and Westerfield (1942:142) list ease of 
“the transportation of funds” as one of the key features for a bank to grow through branching.   
A second major function of banking, as a payments system that converts drafts and checks drawn 
on one bank into cash at another, also turns on transportation capabilities.  Until Congress passed the 
Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, which went into effect October 28, 2004, banks were required to 
physically deliver deposited checks to the banks on which they were drawn.  A legacy of the banking 
system’s reliance on transportation and the physical movement of “money” is that it commonly still takes 
up to five days to credit to customers’ accounts checks drawn against out-of town banks. The need to 
physically transfer money and other bank documents has been a significant constraint on bank growth and 
management. 
That the efficiencies posited by theory and the foregoing hypotheses to accrue to more liberal 
legal environments would be difficult to realize in the absence of an effective transportation system is 
supported by a number of studies that have found transportation costs to be a constraint on financial 
businesses (Gilbert 1998; Garbade and Silber 1979).  Knodel’s (1998) study of the inter-regional 
payments system in two Ohio cities from 1830-1859 describes, for example, how the switch from water 
to rail transport precipitated a dramatic decline in shipping specie and a shift to a new payment method.  
Her analysis suggests that because financial businesses are reliant on hard currency and documents (e.g., 
gold, currency, and bank drafts) developments in transportation capability can significantly influence how 
they are organized.  I argue that in states in which branching was possible throughout, growth was 
constrained by the ability to move people and documents among the different parts of an organization.  
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The size and geographic spread of banks in states with statewide banking would thus be a direct result not 
only of the prevailing legal environment, as argued earlier, but also of the nature and state of the extant 
transportation infrastructure.   
Where the legal environment accommodated branching, developments in transportation 
technology would have abetted the practice, providing opportunities for banks where branching was 
possible.  Geographers have noted the tremendous influence, particularly post-1920, of the automobile 
and development of the highway infrastructure on urban physical and social structures (Borchert 1967).  
Suburbs expanded around major cities and the United States generally became “smaller” as inter-city 
travel became easier and faster.  Contemporaneously, the geographic scope of banks likely increased.  
The effect of interaction between state regulation and expanding transportation infrastructure was 
acknowledged in Southworth’s (1928:118) description of how potential strategies available to banks in 
Michigan (in which branching was permitted) differed from those available to banks in Illinois (in which 
branching was prohibited), yielding two quite different growth strategies for the respective states’ banks.  
The advent of the automobile has brought about traffic difficulties, particularly 
with regard to parking facilities, which make it desirable from the point of view 
of the bank customer that banking offices be established in uncongested parts of 
the city.  If branch banking has been prohibited [in Michigan]…small 
independent banks, as in Chicago for example, would have been established to 
meet the need.  In Detroit, the need was met by the establishment of branches.  
  
A history of NationsBank ties its growth to the growth of suburbs (Covington and Ellis 1993), a 
link made even more explicit in a history of Michigan-based Comerica Bank, which recounts how “when 
most Detroiters still lived around the downtown area, one office served the bank well.  As the population 
moved to the edges of the core city and beyond, banks, like other retailers, had to follow if they wished to 
remain competitive in serving customers” (Comerica 1999:31).  Further, an early description of branch 
banking cites the growth of cities as having important effects on the growth of branching (Collins, 1926) 
and a history of the growth of commercial banking in the US describes that intra-city branches tripled 
between 1920 and 1930, and attributed this increase to geographic dispersion of population as a result of 
the advent of the automobile (Klebaner, 1990). 
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Technical environments thus had two important effects on growth and expansion in banking.   
First, they offered a constraint to inter-unit coordination, particularly management at a distance and the 
movement of paper currency and documents.   This suggests that before adequate transportation was 
possible, it was unlikely that banks would grow much, or expand to outlying locations since there was not 
an effective means of coordination.  Secondly, in states where banks were permitted to grow by 
branching, firms were able to establish branches as urban environments expanded, which was also a result 
of the increasing ease of transportation.  Both these factors should lead to larger individual banks within 
those states as the transportation capability expanded.   
• Hypothesis 2(a): In the period before inter-state banking was possible (1896-1978) states with no 
restriction on statewide banking should have larger banking companies as the transportation 
infrastructure became more advanced. 
 
• Hypothesis 2(b): In the period before inter-state banking was possible (1896-1978), states with no 
restriction on statewide banking should have more geographically dispersed banking companies 
as the transportation infrastructure became more advanced. 
 
Founding Environments and Acquisition Behavior of US Banking Firms during the Period of Inter-
State Competition (1978-2001) 
The discussion thus far has emphasized differences in banking structures consequent to legal and 
technical developments at the state level.  Until 1978, when inter-state banking became possible, there 
was little consequence of this variation beyond different patterns of within-state competition.  The gradual 
deregulation of the industry in the 1980s was effectively an invitation to organizations from 48 different 
systems with separate histories to compete with one another.  The subsequent decline in the number of 
banks was accompanied by significant overall growth of industry assets (Figure 2).   While in 1980 there 
were 12,805 commercial banks, by 2000, the total number was reduced to 6,750. Prior work in the 
banking literature attributes growth by large banks in the 1990s entirely to acquisitions (Stiroh and Poole 
2000), suggesting that the most direct way to study bank growth in the inter-state banking period is by 
examining the banks that pursued acquisitions.   
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Figure 2 about here 
According to Stinchcombe (1965:142), “the groups, institutions, laws, population characteristics 
and sets of social relations that form the environment” are historically contingent and imprint an 
organization with the characteristics of the era in which it was founded.  He reasoned that organizations 
founded during the same historical period, because they faced the same environments and challenges, 
would exhibit similar structural and cultural characteristics and, moreover, that behaviors that responded 
to those conditions would persist even when the conditions changed.  Stinchcombe (1965) discussed, for 
example, that hiring practices that responded to the labor laws that prevailed during the period of 
industrial growth persist not because they fit contemporary conditions, but because it was the way it was 
done under the founding conditions.  More recent investigations have assessed how initial conditions have 
affected a wide range of outcomes and industries including the organizational strategy of semiconductor 
manufacturers (Boeker 1988), rates of change of nonprofits (Tucker, Singh, and Meinhard 1990), and 
organizational mortality of beer brewing and newspapers (Swaminathan 1996). 
Related studies have found organizational capabilities established in a prior period to be 
important to firms’ future strategic advantage and success.  Carroll et al. (1996), for example, observed 
that failure rates of auto manufacturers reflected the firms’ early experiences.  Bicycle and carriage 
makers that entered the auto industry had a survival advantage attributed by the authors to previously 
developed capabilities related to production and assembly as well as marketing and sales.  Similarly, 
Haveman’s (1992) study of California thrifts in the wake of dramatic deregulatory changes found the 
better performing firms to be those with original competencies that were closely related to their new 
activities.  These studies suggest that capabilities developed in an earlier period can give an organization a 
future advantage after a shift in an industry or deregulation. 
In banking, multi-unit practices and structures developed early in response to accommodating 
changes in the legal environment might be expected to be advantageous under present-day legislation that 
encourages acquisitions, which, by definition, entail coordination among multiple units.  The historical 
record identifies a number of capabilities that were likely developed by banks in states that permitted 
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branching.  Among these was the creation of uniform procedures that could easily be exported to acquired 
banks, a strategy James and James (1954) maintain contributed to Bank of America’s early success.  
Similar to other early branch banking systems (Chapman and Westerfield 1942), Bank of America also 
created a regional infrastructure to support the management of outlying offices and, as noted earlier, 
deployed a network of auditors and implemented systematic reporting functions to monitor branch 
activity.  The development of multi-location management capability is a fundamental distinction between 
branch and unit banks. 
The importance of such systems escalates with continued expansion of the spatial distribution of 
locations.  
The nature of the organization will depend to a considerable extent upon the number and 
location of branch offices.… If the branches are all located in the city of the parent bank, 
there is obviously less justification for setting up elaborate rules and regulations to 
control the business, and similarly, if the branches are located in intermediate regions 
there is less need of regulation than would be desirable or necessary in the case of a bank 
operating a large number of branches on a…nation-wide or state-wide basis. (Chapman 
and Westerfield 1942:167) 
 
As suggested by the foregoing discussion, bank management became more complex with 
branching, in particular, with growth in the distribution of branches.  Banks in unit banking states, having 
had to develop only the structures and systems needed to support management in a single location, were 
less likely to have management structures and systems that would enable them to coordinate across 
multiple locations.   Just as initially established structures were found in Meyer and Brown’s (1977) study 
of government finance agencies to have a lasting effect on organizational action, so I maintain that 
fundamental differences in initially established structures will determine which banks subsequently 
successfully expand through acquisitions.  
The legal and technical environments that prevail at the time of its founding are also likely to 
influence an organization’s culture and structure.  Dobbin’s (1994) observation that different societies’ 
regulatory “styles” reflect culture and become embedded in regulatory structures suggests differences in 
the strategies of companies founded in the three countries he studied.  Fligstein (1996) maintained that 
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initial regulatory behavior shapes the development of markets by producing cultural templates that 
determine how companies organize, and Baron, Hannan, and Burton (1999) find that the initial cognitive 
template of founders profoundly influences later organizational behavior.  Finally, Fombrun and Zajac’s 
(1987) study of 114 financial services firms found perception of the external environment to influence 
choice of strategy.  Banks for which multiple locations and geographic expansion were part of the initial 
cultural template might thus be expected to be more likely to conceive of acquiring other firms.  Consider, 
by way of example, the case of North Carolina’s Wachovia Bank and NationsBank at the onset of inter-
state banking (Covington and Ellis 1993:154).  Although both would eventually expand beyond their 
North Carolina roots, “banking analysts who kept track of such things ironically gave Wachovia, not 
(NationsBank), the best chance at gaining from interstate banking.”  This judgment acknowledged 
Wachovia to be financially stronger, but “what analysts could not see on the balance sheets was the 
commitment that (NationsBank) had to the idea [of interstate expansion].”  And as Covington and Ellis 
(1993) argue, it was NationsBank’s intense focus on expanding beyond North Carolina that led to its 
dramatic growth.  If conception of the market does, indeed, shape firms’ outlooks and activities, banks 
that were founded in a unit banking state, likely conceived of themselves as a one office firm and 
therefore would be less likely to acquire or expand.  Conversely, firms that were founded in states where 
branching is possible would not have this constraint. 
The above discussion suggests that, in addition to contemporary environmental conditions 
influencing bank strategy, founding environmental conditions may also affect banks by having a 
significant lingering influence on their ability to coordinate across units and therefore their likelihood of 
acquiring other firms.  Law and technology are particularly important elements of founding environments 
because, as suggested by prior work on imprinting mechanisms (Marquis 2003), they shape firms’ initial 
structures and cultures.  Changes in banking regulation between 1978 and 2001 that expanded banks’ 
potential markets explicitly encouraged industry consolidation through acquisition; a strategy that I 
maintain is more likely to be embraced by banks founded in states in which the prevailing legal and 
technical environments encouraged the development of structures to support multi-unit coordination.  
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Based on the logic for hypothesis 2, this would be states where there was both the ability of banks to 
branch and a greater developed transportation structure.  Furthermore, as a more direct test of the 
coordination mechanism suggested by the above argument, I examine how banks that were founded in 
states where the geographic distribution of branches was greater would be more likely to acquire other 
banks.  
• Hypothesis 3(a):  With the advent of inter-state banking (1978-2001), banks founded when 
statewide banking was unrestricted should be more likely to acquire other banks. 
 
• Hypothesis 3(b):  With the advent of inter-state banking (1978-2001), banks founded when 
banking was restricted to a single office should be less likely to acquire other banks. 
 
• Hypothesis 3(c):  With the advent of inter-state banking (1978-2001), banks founded in states in 
which statewide banking was unrestricted and transportation infrastructure was progressively 
improved should be more likely to acquire other banks. 
 
• Hypothesis 3(d):  With the advent of inter-state banking (1978-2001), banks founded in states in 
which there is a greater geographic dispersion of bank locations should be more likely to acquire 
other banks.   
 
METHODS AND ANALYSES 
Samples and Units of Analysis 
This study involves two samples and two units of analysis.  To test state-level predictions I 
examine annual state-level banking organization for all contiguous US states from 1896 through 1978.  
Following Schneiberg and Bartley (2001) I perform state-year analyses to examine average bank size for 
each state.  The annual state-level data yields 3,941 observations (48 observations for every year, except 
for Oklahoma, which became a state in 1907, and New Mexico and Arizona, which became states in 
1912).  These data are from a number of sources.  The 1896-1955 data are from All-bank Statistics, 
United States, 1896-1955 (Flood 1998), the 1956-1978 data from FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking.  
Because the former used the latter as its primary source but also included information from other sources 
such as state banking commissions and the Federal Reserve, there is a potential for discontinuity between 
the pre- and post-1955 data.  I consequently conducted a number of sensitivity analyses (e.g., removing 
states that appeared to have larger discontinuities) and included a dummy variable indicating whether data 
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were pre- or post-1955.  None of these actions significantly affected the results.  Moreover, because my 
primary dependent variable is the mean of state bank size, any impact would be reduced because the 
discontinuity would affect both the numerator (bank assets) and denominator (number of banks).   
To test the organizational-level hypotheses regarding founding environment I examined all 
banking organizations that existed between 1978 and 2001. From the annual end-of-year Commercial 
Bank and Bank Holding Company files at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
(http://chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/) I constructed a database of more than 235,000 
observations corresponding to the approximately 25,000 banking organizations that existed during this 
period.  Because of missing observations for some financial variables, I test my predictions on a dataset 
that includes approximately 222,000 observations.2  I define banking organization at the highest level of 
ownership (i.e., all subsidiaries are included in one observation corresponding to the bank designated as 
the primary bank), presuming decision-making authority regarding major strategies such as acquisitions 
to reside at that level.  This is in contrast to the economic literature, which treats subsidiary banks with 
separate charters as independent organizations or, alternatively, aggregates based on state.  By way of 
example, if Bank One Corporation owns separately chartered banks in Ohio including Bank One 
Columbus and Bank One Cincinnati, and in Indiana including Bank One Indianapolis and Bank One Fort 
Wayne, by my definition all four banks in both states would be considered one organization.  Others, 
because each has a charter, treat them as four separate banks (e.g., Rhoades 2000; Wheelock and Wilson 
2002) or, alternatively, group them by state giving two observations (Stiroh and Strahan 2003).  Because 
accounts from the time indicate that acquisition strategies were set by corporate headquarters, for 
example, that Bank One CEO John McCoy and his staff, not the managers of local banks or even the 
presidents of state banks, made acquisition decisions (Murray 1995), all subsidiaries are considered to be 
part of the parent bank. 
                                                 
2 The majority were organizations that existed for only one year.  Because I use lagged variables in the analyses, 
firms that exist for only one year fall of out the analysis, there being no prior year values.  The results are similar 
when I use contemporaneous values that enable me to include the firms that existed for only one year.  
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Dependent Variables 
Average size of banks. For the main dependent variable in the state-level analyses I use average 
bank size to measure how each state’s history of regulatory environment generates larger or smaller 
banks.3  Another way to conceptualize bank presence in a state would be via a concentration index such 
as a Herfindhal or four-firm concentration ratio.  My data source that extends to 1896, however, though it 
has information on the total number of banks and total banking assets, lacks information on the sizes of 
individual banking firms, which is necessary to calculate a concentration index.  Moreover, because my 
interest is in how state laws influence bank growth, which is reflected in size not in concentration, I 
believe my current measure of average size to be the most appropriate.   
Geographic dispersion of bank locations.  As a supplement to the variable average size of 
banks, I measure the degree to which branches are geographically dispersed by examining the percentage 
of bank locations in a state that are outside of banks’ headquarters location.  This measure taps the 
coordination mechanism implied by my arguments; the greater the geographic dispersion of branches, the 
greater the coordination needed between headquarters and branches.  This data is from the Federal 
Reserve, which published annually from 1929 to 1992 counts of branches that indicated whether a 
particular branch was in its bank’s head-office city.  Prior to 1929 the Federal Reserve published these 
and historical counts sporadically, so between 1896 and 1929 a number of years are linearly interpolated.  
This early period was mostly characterized by small numbers of outlying branch locations, and these 
values appear to be stable, so interpolating the values should not be an issue.   
Acquisition.  For my organizational-level analyses I use a dichotomous variable to indicate 
whether a banking organization acquired another bank during a given year.  This data is from both the 
Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company Merger databases maintained by the Chicago Federal 
Reserve.  Alternative approaches might include using a count or the size of acquisitions in a given year.  I 
                                                 
3 All financial variables are in 2001 dollars. 
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chose to dichotomize this variable for several reasons.  First, more than 80% of my organization-year 
observations that are greater than zero are one.  Moreover, many acquisitions that were of one firm based 
on my definition of highest level ownership were coded in these databases as multiple acquisitions if 
more than one subsidiary was acquired.  Finally, more complex models are computationally intensive, 
which is an issue given the size of my database.  For example, with my database it takes approximately 24 
hours to run one Tobit regression with the dependent variable of total value of acquisitions (results are not 
substantially different than with the dichotomous variable). So, for this additional, practical reason I 
dichotomize this variable and use logistic regression.   
 
Independent Variables  
State regulations.  I created annual state-level legal environment histories for all 48 states in the 
sample from 1896 to 2001.  To construct these regulatory histories I examined more than 15 secondary 
sources as well as, in many cases, actual state statutes.  (Appendix A explains how this time series data 
was constructed.)  Regulations were divided into three categories: full statewide banking (i.e., no 
geographic restrictions on locations); unit banking (banks limited to one location); and limited statewide 
banking (branching permitted, but geographically restricted).  To capture these types, dummy variables 
were created for statewide banking and unit banking.  Using limited statewide banking as the omitted 
category enabled me to test both unit banking and statewide banking effects, and is more conservative 
than comparing just branching versus non-branching states.  Because branching in limited statewide 
banking states was typically highly proscribed (e.g., limited to only two offices or a specific geographic 
area), being in a unit banking state is being compared to being in states that permitted only a few offices 
instead of states in which branching was unrestricted.  Conversely, being in a statewide banking state is 
being compared to being in states in which it was possible to have a few offices instead of states in which 
branching was prohibited.  To establish legal environment at time of founding I used the bank founding 
date in the Chicago Federal Reserve database.  In the absence of information on banking laws prior to 
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1896, all banks founded earlier were considered to be founded under the laws that existed in 1896 (or first 
year of statehood in the cases of Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma).  
Transportation infrastructure.  To test the hypotheses that statewide banking would be more 
likely to affect bank size as the transportation infrastructure became more developed, I created a measure 
of transportation infrastructure for each state-year.  One possibility would be to operationalize this as total 
highway mileage, however, I was unable to locate this data for the target historical period.  I was able to 
identify two alternative operationalizations for which I was able to locate the requisite data for almost the 
entire period: annual state capital spending on roadways; and annual state level highway maintenance.  
Data for both of these operationalizations are from annual publications of Highway Statistics by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. Capital spending on roadways should reflect the expansion of highways 
and level of highway maintenance a direct function of the extent of roadways.  These measures have the 
additional benefit that they should also capture the quality of roads, which would significantly affect 
transportation capability.  And furthermore, they would reflect road width and number of lanes, items that 
would not be fully captured by a simple measure of mileage.  At the national level since 1921, when the 
data became available, however, both measures correlate at .95 with total highway mileage.  Because 
these data extend back only to 1921, to be able to use the full range of observations on my dependent 
variable I had to extrapolate back from 1921 to 1896.  To accomplish this for both variables I multiplied 
the percent of overall highway expenditures in 1921 by the percent change in total national highway 
mileage (data for which exists back to 1900).  For example, in 1921 national maintenance expenditures 
totaled $65,000 (11 states had $0 and 20 states less than $200).  New York’s $9,000 represented 14% of 
the total.  National mileage that year increased by 15% (to 55,000 miles), so for New York for example, I 
subtracted 15% from $9,000 to get approximately $7,500.   By 1900, the end of this data series, total 
national mileage is reduced to 100.  To get the 1896 to 1899 values I linearly interpolated for each state 
under the assumption that in 1896 there were 0 miles.  Inasmuch as the highway system did not grow 
significantly until after 1921, the extrapolation and interpolation of these values should not bias the 
analyses.  Highway maintenance and highway capital expenditures are correlated at 0.97 and both return 
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similar results in the analyses, so I created a principle component factor score of the extent of highways 
for each state-year.  This variable is included in the analyses as a control and used for the interaction 
terms with the unit banking and statewide banking variables.    
Geographic dispersion of bank locations.  To more directly test the coordination mechanism 
that I theorize underlies the imprinting effect, I use the dependent variable for the state-level analyses 
described above as an independent variable in my organizational level analyses.  As this data covers only 
the period before 1992, organizations founded in 1993 or later are excluded from these analyses, reducing 
the sample by approximately 1,000 banks, from about 25,000 to about 24,000.  Organizations from this 
recently founded group account for fewer than 100 of the approximately 3,250 bank-year acquisition 
observations during the period.   
 
Control Variables  
I included a number of control variables in both the state- and organizational-level analyses.   To 
account for state-level economic conditions and potential endogeneity issues with large banks potentially 
influencing state laws, the state-level analyses include, among other controls, a lagged dependent variable 
in the equations (so the analyses start in 1897) as well as measures of the strength of various interest 
groups in each state.   As noted earlier, I assembled this list of variables by consulting Ingram and Rao 
(2004) as well as economic work on banks influencing laws (e.g. Abrams and Settle 1993; Calomiris 
1993; Kane 1996; White 1984).  Owing to the sporadic reporting of some of these variables, particularly 
for the earlier period studied, some are interpolated via the ipolate command in STATA.  These include 
the percentage of the population that lived in urbanized areas, data for which were obtained from the US 
Census Bureau at 10-year intervals beginning in 1900.  To account for multiple cities in a state I created 
as a measure of state urban centralization a Herfindahl index of the concentration of state urban 
population in large cities.  For example, Illinois, in which the majority of the urban population is in 
Chicago, would have a higher value than Ohio, in which the urban population is spread across many 
cities.  The number of banks per capita was calculated using the state-level banking database described 
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earlier together with population figures from the Census.4  I also include a measure of bank deposits per 
capita at the beginning of the period under study (1896) to account for early bank power which may have 
influenced the state laws.  Data that characterized two important types of customers were also collected.  
The power of farmers was reflected in data on the average size of farms collected from the US 
Agriculture Department’s historical database on farms, the power of the manufacturing sector in data on 
the percent of manufacturing employment collected from Historical Statistics of the States of the United 
States (Dodd 1993) and the Census Bureau.  Additional controls for state-level economic conditions 
include per capita income (data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and, prior to 1929, Population 
Redistribution and Economic Growth, 1870-1950 (Lee et al. 1957)) and total population (data from the 
US Census Bureau).5   To account for the fact that highway mileage grew during the time period studied 
and is to some extent a function of the size of a state, I included a linear time trend variable and the square 
miles of the state and annual dummies for all years.  Some of these variables are also included in the 
organizational-level analyses.   
At the organizational level the two most important controls related to bank acquisitions are bank 
performance and bank size.  Following Stiroh and Strahan (2003) I use a relative performance measure, 
return on owners equity (ROE) normalized (via z-score) to state peers, and include an alternative measure 
of raw performance operationalized as total income divided by total assets.  To operationalize bank size I 
include a variable that measures a bank’s total assets.  These financial variables are from the databases 
described above and are lagged one year.  In the organizational-level analysis I included state as well as 
annual dummies.  
                                                 
4 This is included only in the analyses in which percent locations at a distance is the dependent variable.  For the 
analyses of average bank size in a state, “number of banks” is in the numerator of this independent variable as well 
as in the denominator of the dependent variable.  Running models in which I included it (not presented, but available 
upon request) did not significantly affect the levels of the hypothesized variables. 
5 As an additional check on economic effects varying across states with different legal regimes, in models not 
presented here but available upon request I also included interaction terms between types of branching law and per 
capita income.  Including these variables did not affect the significance levels of the hypothesized variables. 
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I also included variables that indicated whether a bank’s headquarters was in an urban area 
(MSA), the age of the bank in years (logged because of extreme values, e.g., the Bank of New York was 
founded in 1784), and whether the bank was a multi-bank holding company (Barnett, Greve, and Park 
1994) as well as a dummy variable to indicate whether the bank had previously acquired another bank.  
To account for the uniqueness of being in the world’s financial center I included a dummy variable that 
indicated whether a bank was an early New York bank. In the organizational-level analyses I included a 
control to identify whether the state permitted inter-state banking and a count of the number of 
acquisitions in the previous year to account for waves of mergers (Stearns and Allan 1996).  
 
Statistical Models 
I have two sets of models.  One set is used to predict mean bank size and geographic dispersion of 
banks at the state level from 1896-1978, the second to predict organizational-level acquisitions in the 
period from 1978-2001.  
State-level analysis (1896-1978). Primary considerations in deciding the appropriate model for 
my state-level analyses include (1) multiple observations for each state, and (2) the likelihood of a high 
degree of autocorrelation between a given year and the previous year.  Given this time series panel 
structure I used Prais-Winston regression with a panel specific autoregressive disturbance structure 
(xtpcse command in STATA, with autocorrelation = psar 1).6  In such situations, Beck (2001, and see 
Guillén and Suárez, 2005 for a recent empirical example) recommends a model with panel corrected 
standard errors and a lagged dependent variable which I also include.  The Prais-Winston estimator is a 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator corrected for first-order serially-correlated residuals that are 
specific to each panel (i.e., within states as opposed to across the entire dataset, as is customary with time-
                                                 
6 I conducted numerous sensitivity checks. This included running other potential models, including general fixed 
and random effects models with an autoregressive term (STATA command xtregar), and an instrumental variable 
model with an Arellano-Bond estimator (STATA command xtabond2).  The results from the Prais-Winston analyses 
are similar and in most cases significantly more conservative than those obtained by these other methods.    
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series analyses).  This estimation technique, identical to the Cochrane-Orcutt time-series technique save 
that it provides an estimate for the first year of data (Ostrom 1990), transforms each variable through the 
following formulas.  Note that ρ is the autocorrelation estimate, the year-to-year correlation of the 
residuals from the time-series analysis.  
• Y* = Yt - ρYt-1 
• X* = Xt - ρXt-1  
• a* (constant) = a (1-ρ)   
 
The Prais-Winston technique transforms the first observation as follows: 
• Y* = Y ρ (1-ρ2)  
• X* = X ρ (1-ρ2) 
 
Organizational-level analysis (1978-2001). Because I predict whether a bank engages in 
acquisition, I use logistic regression with a 1 indicating an acquisition in a given year.  Because I have 
multiple observations for many banks in the study period, not all observations are independent.  To 
correct for this I use a random effects panel model that accounts for situations in which there are multiple 
observations per firm over time (xtlogit command in STATA).  Because some organizations are in the 
dataset for only one year it is not possible to use fixed effects, as there would be no variance on the 
dependent variable for those firms.  As noted, I do nevertheless include year and state-level fixed effects 
to control for any unobserved time and spatial effects.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics and correlations of the state-level and 
organizational-level variables, respectively.   Tables 4 and 5 present the regression models for the state-
level and organizational-level analyses, respectively. 
 
Tables 1-4 about here 
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Models 1 to 3 in Table 3 present the state-level analyses with average bank size per state as the 
dependent variable, models 4 to 6 with geographic dispersion of branches as the dependent variable.   The 
first model in each of these sets presents just the control variables, the second the equations with only the 
banking law variables added, and the third the full models including the controls, main effects for laws, 
and interaction terms with laws and transportation infrastructure.  Regarding Hypothesis 1, which predicts 
that statewide banking states are more likely (H1a) and unit banking states less likely (H1b) to have larger 
banks, model 2 supports both predictions.  Although I do not hypothesize about the effect of these main 
effects on the dispersion of banking, model 5 corroborates the findings in equation 2.   
In the full models (3 and 6), in which I consider the interaction terms between transportation 
infrastructure and state laws, the interaction between statewide banking and transportation infrastructure 
is statistically significant supporting both H2a and H2b, that is, that as transportation becomes more 
advanced in statewide banking states banks become larger and more geographically dispersed.  The 
results of these analyses indicate that regulatory differences influence banking at the state level and that 
this effect is, to some extent, historically contingent. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
The graphs presented in Figures 3 and 4 show the predicted effects of the unit* highway and 
statewide* highway interactions on the two dependent variables.  Note that for both the intercepts of the 
statewide interaction are higher than those of the unit banking interaction and, further, that the slope of 
the statewide interaction is steeper.  This is particularly the case for the geographic dispersion of 
branches.  A more developed transportation infrastructure appears to accentuate the effect of statewide 
banking in terms of both the growth and geographic dispersion of banks.   
Many of the control variables in the state level analyses are not statistically significant, which, 
given the lagged average size variable and annual dummy variables, is not necessarily surprising, since 
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these variables capture much of the variance of the dependent variables.7  Lagged average bank size is a 
very strong predictor in both sets of models.  In the analysis in which the dependent variable is the 
percentage of locations outside of the headquarters city, urban centralization is significant in the positive 
direction, and the percent urbanization results are negative.  So in states where population is concentrated 
in fewer cities, banks are more likely to establish branches outside their headquarters city, however this 
effect is tampered by the overall city size.  
Table 4 presents the organizational-level analyses that test hypotheses 3a-d. Model 7 presents the 
control variables and model 8 adds the main effect for legal environment during founding, model 9 the 
interactions between state laws and transportation infrastructure.  Model 10 includes the controls and the 
degree to which the state banking industry is geographically dispersed.  Model 11 is a full model 
including all of the variables.  Neither H3a nor H3b, which predicted the main effects of statewide 
branching and unit banking at founding on bank mergers, were supported.  However, the interaction effect 
between statewide banking and highway infrastructure (H4c) was significant, indicating that it is not just 
initial regulatory conditions but the technical environment as well that determines how banks conceive of 
their market.  The effect of being in a state with geographically dispersed locations, is a significant 
predictor in model 10, which lends support to H4d, that banks founded in locations in which coordination 
over distances was necessary were likely to develop in response capabilities that would later enable and 
dispose them to acquire other banks.  In model 11, however, which includes the state law variables, this 
variable is no longer significant.  This result is not entirely surprising since it is the transportation 
infrastructure that likely led to the ability to establish locations.  The statewide branching and 
transportation at founding interaction in model 11 continues to be a significant predictor of which banks 
subsequently acquire other banks.  
                                                 
7 In models without the annual dummies, in addition to the current pattern of findings, the percent urban variable is 
positively significant in models 1-3, (i.e. states with a greater percentage of urban residents exhibit a greater 
likelihood of having larger banks), and the measure of entrenched bank power, bank deposits in 1896 is significant 
in models 1-6.  
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Results of some control variables used in the organizational-level analyses are also quite 
interesting.  First, contrary to economic research (Stiroh and Strahan 2003) and the goal of banking 
deregulation, it appears that bank size influences to a much greater degree than bank performance which 
banks acquire other banks.  As would be expected based on prior analyses of changes following 
deregulation in the financial services industry (Haveman, 1993), larger banks are more likely to acquire 
other firms.  Also more likely to acquire other banks are banks in cities, banks organized as multi-bank 
holding companies, and banks that have previously acquired another bank.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined the effect of historical environments on the coordination and growth of 
large-scale organizations in the US banking industry.  I examined two levels of analysis during two key 
historical eras.  My state-level analyses between 1896 and 1978 showed that states in which statewide 
banking was permitted and transportation infrastructure was more advanced had larger and more 
geographically dispersed banks than states in which these conditions did not exist.  This translated at the 
organizational level into banks founded when branching was permitted and the technical capability to 
grow existed being more likely to pursue acquisitions.  I argue that banks founded in environments in 
which coordination over distances was desirable developed capabilities that later disposed them to be 
more likely to acquire other banks. 
These results support my argument that to understand growth and scale in organizations and 
industries one must understand the environmental conditions that enable coordination particular to the 
industry-specific type of interdependency.  As I argued and found, the growth of service organizations, 
for which pooled interdependency is most important, was contingent on much different environmental 
factors than was the growth of industrial firms. In particular, my analyses show the importance of laws 
that permit organizations to establish multiple locations (Ingram and Rao 2004) and technology that 
enables them to effectively coordinate between those locations and headquarters.   
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Beyond the main effect of legal environments on firms, it is important to emphasize the 
interaction between legal and technical environments.  This variable had an effect on both state-level bank 
size and the likelihood that a bank would acquire another bank, suggesting that it is necessary to 
understand both legal and technical environments in order to understand the rise of large organizations.   
Efficiency-oriented theories that emphasize the effects of technological environments (Chandler 1977) 
and political approaches that emphasize the effects of laws (Roy 1997) on the rise of large organizations 
are often seen as alternative explanations. My analyses suggest that these explanations might, in fact, be 
complementary and organizational growth be dependent on both factors.  How interaction between the 
legal and technical environments during the early part of the twentieth century enabled the rise of large 
industrial firms has not yet been examined.  
The imprinting effect of legal and technical environments is also worthy of comment.  As I 
argued, initial conditions would exert both structural and cultural influences on firms’ ability to 
coordinate across locations and, consequently, on their ability to acquire other firms.  The effect of the 
statewide branching and highway interaction and of the geographic dispersion of locations during 
founding both suggest the early development of a capability that proved useful to banks during the period 
of inter-state consolidation.  These findings, together with the ones discussed above, point to a dual effect 
of historical environments both as a general influence on economic environment and industry structure 
and as an enduring influence on social structures based on conditions at founding.  To understand social 
forms one thus needs to study both contemporary conditions and how historical environments have 
changed over time.  
As I observed at the outset, during the period when inter-state banking was not possible this 
variation had little consequence beyond different patterns of within-state competition.  When inter-state 
banking became possible after 1978, banks in states that had the most favorable laws came to dominate 
the industry.  I argue that this is because they had an advantage in both size and the ability to coordinate 
across locations.   In the contemporary banking market, some banks are clearly advantaged by their states’ 
regulatory history.  Statewide banking and advanced transportation infrastructure translated into larger 
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banks and advantageous founding conditions into a greater likelihood to grow through acquisition.  It is 
also clear that originating in a unit banking state disadvantages banks in the national market context.  In 
both the state-level and organizational-level analyses, unit banking states’ banks are, on average, smaller 
and less likely to acquire other banks than banks in the reference category of limited statewide banking 
states.   
How these developments played out over the twentieth century can be seen in Figure 5, which 
depicts relative bank size in three states with dramatically different regulatory histories, North Carolina, 
Alabama, and Colorado.  The y-axis plots the z-score of total banking assets for each state which depicts 
how each state-year observation relates to the mean value of bank size across all 48 contiguous states for 
that year. 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Note that all three states had smaller than average banks prior to the turn of the century.  
Subsequently, banks in Colorado, which remained a unit banking state for almost the entire twentieth 
century, remained in the lower half of the distribution.  Banks in North Carolina, which permitted 
statewide banking throughout the twentieth century, gradually increased in size through branching as the 
transportation infrastructure progressively developed, then became dramatically larger with the advent of 
inter-state banking.  Alabama, which started as a unit banking state, initiated limited statewide banking in 
1935, and transitioned to statewide branching in 1991 is an example of a middle ground between states 
like North Carolina and Colorado.   These results suggest that one possible consequence of the recent 
wave of deregulatory activity across many industries in the United States including transportation, 
communication, utilities, health care, and agriculture (Wholey and Sanchez 1991; Lounsbury, Hirsch, and 
Klinkerman 1998) might be an uneven distribution of power based on where and when organizations 
were founded.    In addition to adding to our understanding of the growth of firms in service industries, 
these results further suggest that the US historical experience of federalism has had a lasting influence on 
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economic organization and that the history of state laws plays an important if little recognized role in how 
industries are organized.     
How the effects of historical environments have influenced organizational growth and structures 
in a wide variety of industries is still an open question; however anecdotal and case-based evidence 
suggests that understanding historical backgrounds can inform our understanding of growth and structures 
in organizations and industries.   Consider the early development of airlines such as Southwest and 
Pacific Southwest in Texas and California, respectively.  These states had among the most favorable state 
laws for founding an airline and importantly a physical geography composed of large, dispersed 
population centers that made air travel an attractive alternative to surface travel (Freiberg and Freiberg 
1996).  Like North Carolina’s banks, these airlines were well positioned when airline deregulation 
occurred in 1978.  In the past 25 years Southwest has become a major airline and Pacific Southwest also 
expanded rapidly following deregulation before being acquired by USAir in 1987.    
Understanding the disparate historical backgrounds of firms and industries can also provide 
traction on questions of global competitiveness.  Porter (1990) suggests, for example, that the historical 
conditions of national industries might help to explain how some firms have come to dominate global 
environments.  Japan’s long-time emphasis on state-sponsorship led to international success in the 
automotive and electronic industries and Germany came to dominate the synthetic dye industry as a result 
of the lack of patent controls relative to Britain and France (Murmann 2003).  A more recent example is 
debate within the European Union about the status of companies and industries that previously enjoyed 
significant state support (Theil 2004; The Economist 2004).  In much the same way that the US banking 
market consolidated following national integration, European countries are currently struggling with how 
their “national champion” firms will fit into a deregulated European market.  While some argue that 
continuing to protect “national champions” is a threat to the freedom of European markets, in defining 
freedom as only what occurs after deregulation, this argument fails to recognize the unique historical 
conditions that may create advantage or disadvantage for some firms based solely on where and when 
they were founded.
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Appendix A: Assembling Data on Intra-State Banking Laws from 1896-2001 
Data on state-level intra-state banking regulations for the 48 contiguous US states from 1896-2001 were 
collected from numerous sources.  Chapman and Westerfield (1942) report a survey from the Comptroller 
of the Currency that contains information on branching regulations in 1896.  A number of sources cite this 
as the first survey of branch banking in the United States.  Fischer (1968) cites as sources for his report on 
regulatory changes between 1896 and 1909 the Comptroller of the Currency and, for 1910, the National 
Monetary Commission.  For 1910, I examined Fischer’s source, the “Digest of State Banking Statutes,” 
compiled by Weldon Frederick for the National Monetary Commission.  Bradford’s (1940) “The Legal 
Status of Branching in the United States” contains information assembled from a periodic publication of 
the Federal Reserve for the years 1910, 1924, 1929, 1932, 1936, and 1939.  I also examined the Federal 
Reserve publication “State Laws Relating to Branch Banking” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1925; 
April, 1930; July 1932; November, 1936; October 1939; July 1951 contains the text of the state statutes).  
Fischer’s (1968:62-63) state-by-state breakdown of intra-state banking and regulations between 1924 and 
1967 documents the years of changes.  The Federal Reserve’s monograph-length Compilation of Federal 
and State Statutes Relating to Branch Banking, published in December 1956, and October 1967, contains 
the statutes at those times.  For the period after 1967 I use various years’ of the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors A Profile of State-Chartered Banking, published bi-annually beginning in 1965.  Berger, 
Kashyap, and Scalise (1994) have made a summary of laws since 1960, Rhoades’s (1981) “Banking 
Structure and Performance at the State Level During the 1970s” recounts the regulations in effect during 
the 1970s, and Hannan and Prager’s (1998) “The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in the Banking Industry: 
An Empirical Investigation” has data from 1986-1994. For some of the earlier years I had to make 
assumptions about branching regulations.  Fischer (1968) maintains that regulation during this period was 
in many cases by custom rather than law and I followed his assessment of the type of branching enforced 
in a given state.  For the few cases for which I did not have branch law information for a particular year I 
assumed the legal history to be continuous (e.g., if I had information that Illinois was a unit banking state 
in 1911 and 1915 I assumed that it was a unit banking state from 1912-1914).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations, State-level Analyses 1896-1978 
  Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Average Size (log) 10.488 1.381               
   
2 Statewide Banking 0.307 0.461 0.260                 
3 Unit Banking 0.407 0.491 -0.453 -0.552                
4 Statewide * Highway -0.040 0.427 0.423 -0.142 0.078               
5 Unit * Highway -0.173 0.576 0.459 0.201 -0.363 -0.029              
6 Total Population (log) 14.367 1.073 0.354 -0.204 -0.140 0.241 0.312             
7 Per Capita Income 9839 5216 0.806 0.114 -0.232 0.396 0.392 0.230            
8 Percent Urban 0.499 0.210 0.810 0.038 -0.236 0.300 0.400 0.438 0.689           
9 State Urban Centralization 0.473 0.378 0.078 0.026 -0.019 -0.112 0.039 0.221 -0.001 0.222          
10 Percent Manufacturing 0.075 0.048 0.435 0.057 -0.223 0.079 0.113 0.296 0.284 0.627 0.150         
11 Average Farm Acres (log) 5.304 0.954 0.147 0.038 0.132 0.137 0.085 -0.407 0.337 0.039 -0.203 -0.508        
12 Highway -0.148 0.805 0.697 0.013 -0.287 0.518 0.725 0.471 0.656 0.557 -0.027 0.168 0.149       
13 Number Banks/Capita 0.000 0.000 -0.675 -0.297 0.513 -0.108 -0.407 -0.312 -0.355 -0.473 -0.079 -0.332 0.124 -0.420      
14 Average Size  (t-1) 10.447 1.374 0.998 0.257 -0.450 0.422 0.457 0.355 0.807 0.812 0.079 0.439 0.145 0.695 -0.670     
15 Num. Banks/ Capita 1896 363.3 406.0 0.462 0.029 -0.237 0.046 0.018 0.269 0.236 0.584 0.110 0.599 -0.297 0.069 -0.283 0.465    
16 Square Miles 64580 47182 -0.091 -0.083 0.214 0.052 0.042 0.020 0.014 -0.093 -0.114 -0.520 0.594 0.035 0.142 -0.094 -0.316   
17 Time 42.850 23.53 0.757 0.081 -0.297 0.496 0.626 0.277 0.783 0.511 -0.062 0.084 0.307 0.914 -0.460 0.755 -0.008 0.013  
18 Percent Locations out HQ 0.149 0.212 0.721 0.566 -0.550 0.421 0.203 0.062 0.578 0.361 -0.021 0.145 0.177 0.458 -0.478 0.717 0.129 -0.060 0.578 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations, Organizational-level Analyses 1978-2001 
  mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
 
19 20 21 
1 Return on Equity (t-1) 0.953 3.670                   
   
2 Income/Assets (t-1) 0.079 0.100 0.065                  
   
3 
Bank Total Assets (log, 
t-1) 11.152 1.285 0.016 -0.036                 
   
4 Acquisition (DV) 0.013 0.113 0.002 -0.004 0.222                
   
5 
Unit Bank State at 
Founding 0.641 0.480 -0.001 -0.026 -0.150 -0.025               
   
6 
Statewide  Bank State at 
Founding 0.167 0.373 0.002 0.034 0.092 0.026 -0.599              
   
7 Highway at Founding -0.490 1.176 0.018 0.041 -0.054 -0.023 -0.341 0.214             
   
8 
Unit Bank * Highway at 
Founding 5901 30219 0.030 0.005 -0.073 -0.013 0.146 -0.087 0.328            
   
9 
Statewide 
Bank*Highway at 
Founding 10618 53710 -0.009 0.017 -0.009 -0.003 -0.264 0.442 0.363 -0.039           
   
10 HQ in MSA 0.459 0.498 0.020 0.031 0.328 0.060 -0.156 0.138 0.309 0.108 0.164          
   
11 Bank Age (log) 4.118 0.708 -0.013 -0.057 0.114 0.030 0.352 -0.301 -0.911 -0.314 -0.518 -0.285         
   
12 Multi-BHC 0.495 0.500 0.004 -0.018 0.233 0.083 0.104 -0.086 -0.055 -0.042 -0.061 -0.006 0.057        
   
13 Previous Merger 0.055 0.229 -0.001 -0.011 0.370 0.212 -0.035 0.034 -0.037 -0.024 -0.01 0.080 0.053 0.163       
   
14 Unit Banking 0.179 0.384 0.006 0.013 -0.159 -0.042 0.344 -0.209 -0.041 0.061 -0.092 -0.056 0.039 -0.098 -0.093       
  
15 Statewide Banking 0.500 0.500 -0.013 -0.032 0.172 0.045 -0.194 0.278 0.130 0.035 0.198 0.121 -0.173 0.123 0.165 -0.468      
  
16 Inter-state Banking 0.548 0.498 -0.020 -0.039 0.146 0.036 -0.103 0.095 0.103 0.056 0.140 0.077 -0.139 0.1361 0.288 -0.445 0.586     
  
17 Per Capita Income 16830 6475 -0.028 -0.035 0.165 0.037 -0.073 0.117 0.127 0.027 0.233 0.120 -0.172 0.1447 0.306 -0.386 0.641 0.766    
  
18 Percent Urban 0.706 0.122 0.009 0.004 0.142 0.006 -0.053 0.109 0.275 0.135 0.196 0.331 -0.233 0.0173 -0.028 0.016 0.201 0.167 0.354   
  
19 Number of Banks 514.22 407.01 0.015 0.009 -0.151 -0.039 0.426 -0.281 0.058 0.309 -0.097 0.012 -0.005 -0.085 -0.033 0.416 -0.371 -0.206 -0.181 0.375  
  
20 Average Bank Size 18.235 1.036 0.006 -0.005 0.171 0.009 -0.039 0.037 0.203 0.157 0.178 0.262 -0.123 0.0173 -0.059 -0.002 0.063 0.151 0.226 0.702 0.510
 
21 % Locations out HQ 0.0993 0.224 -0.0003 0.0086 0.0786 0.0444 -0.5657 0.5474 0.5759 -0.0691 0.6006 0.2465 -0.6553 -0.0893 0.0008 -0.2006 0.2775 0.1216 0.1366 0.2239 -0.267 0.1218  
22 Early New York 0 .0098 .0988 0.0112 0.0037 -0.0156 0.1475 0.0724 -0.0425 -0.0992 -0.0194 -0.0194 0.057 0.1164 -0.0373 0.0215 -0.0464 0.0997 0.0372 0.0446 0.1179 -0.079 0.2391 -0.0432 
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Table 3: State-level Analyses of Bank Size and Geographic Dispersion, 1896-1978 
Prais-Winston Time Series Panel Regression (PSAR1 disturbance), with Year Fixed Effects 
 
Year Dummies omitted.  Standard errors in parentheses. Two tail tests: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  †Coefficients multiplied by 1,000,000.
 DV: Average Bank Size per State (log) DV: Percent Locations Outside HQ City 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Statewide Banking  0.0145** 0.0198**  0.0278** 0.0389** 
  (0.0044) (0.0043)  (0.0052) (0.0057) 
Unit Banking  -0.0165** -0.0200**  -0.0034 -0.0121** 
  (0.0054) (0.0056)  (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Statewide * Highway†   0.0101*   0.0367** 
   (0.0047)   (0.0065) 
Unit * Highway†   -0.0090+   -0.0135* 
   (0.0050)   (0.0053) 
Total Population (log) 0.0003 0.0047 0.0029 -0.0127 -0.0116 -0.0120 
 (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0101) (0.0095) (0.0098) 
Per Capita Income† 2.753+ 2.940+ 2.495 0.586 0.723 0.906 
 (1.472) (1.510) (1.523) (1.090) (1.097) (1.111) 
Percent Urban -0.0171 0.0082 0.0277 -0.0564 -0.0694 -0.1315* 
 (0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0666) (0.0599) (0.0581) 
State Urban Centralization 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0489** 0.0389** 0.0423** 
 (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Percent Manufacturing -0.0186 0.0282 0.0240 -0.1506 -0.1288 -0.0092 
 (0.1305) (0.1262) (0.1254) (0.1472) (0.1338) (0.1375) 
Average Farm Acres (log) -0.0003 0.0036 0.0031 -0.0370** -0.0143 -0.0195 
 (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0135) 
Highway -0.0054 -0.0172 -0.0064 -0.0201+ -0.0257* -0.0181 
 (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0117) 
Number Banks/Capita  See note 4  -139.9** -133.1** -159.5** 
    (2.316) (2.222) (2.393) 
Average Bank Size (t-1) 0.9946** 0.9815** 0.9762** 0.0544** 0.0600** 0.0593** 
 (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0057) 
Deposits/Capita 1896† 0.5013 1.1819 1.4818 4.7922+ 3.6880+ 0.1059 
 (0.9094) (0.9101) (0.9236) (2.697) (2.133) (1.8200) 
Square Miles† 0.0053 0.0075* 0.0091* 0.2001** 0.1715** 0.1551** 
 (0.0346) (0.0354) (0.0362) (0.0392) (0.0340) (0.0294) 
Time† 0.0010 0.0016 0.0026* 0.0013 -0.0009 0.0000 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Constant 5.474** 5.568** 6.017** -0.6936** -7.088** -1.002** 
 (1.3195) (1.297) (1.345) (0.2265) (2.1677) (2.295) 
Observations 3896 3896 3896 3896 3896 3896 
Number of groups (state) 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Wald Chi Sq 104109.67 121502.43 127162.88 505.999 663.35 687.57 
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Table 4: Organizational-level Analyses of Bank Acquisitions, 1978-2001 
Random Effects Logistic Regression w/ State and Year Fixed Effects (Acquisition = 1) 
 
Year and state dummies omitted.  Standard errors in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%. †Coefficients multiplied by 1,000,000. 
 
 7 8 9 10 11 
Unit Bank State at Founding  -0.1354 -0.1363  -0.1464 
  (0.1020) (0.1037)  (0.1048) 
Statewide Bank State at Founding  0.0340 -0.0294  -0.0461 
  (0.1217) (0.1253)  (0.1287) 
Unit Bank* Highway at Founding   -0.1625  -1.416 
   (0.1272)  (1.333) 
Statewide Bank* Highway at Founding†   0.1274*  1.777* 
   (0.6038)  (0.7973) 
Percent Locations Outside HQ City at 
Founding†    0.4277* 0.2057 
    (0.2094) (0.2264) 
Organizational-level Controls      
Return on Equity (t-1) -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
Income/Assets (t-1) -4.155* -4.134* -4.074* -4.612** -4.4888* 
 (1.7112) (1.7126) (1.7027) (1.7704) (1.763) 
Bank Total Assets (log, t-1) 0.7540** 0.7521** 0.7503** 0.7549** 0.7518* 
 (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0223) 
HQ in MSA 0.0705 0.0757 0.0793 0.0735 0.0789 
 (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0623) (0.0623) 
Bank Age (log) -0.0850 -0.0550 0.0390 -0.0374 -0.0021 
 (0.0970) (0.1016) (0.1148) (0.1366) (0.1481) 
Multi-BHC 0.8624** 0.8621** 0.8676** 0.8603** 0.8671* 
 (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0670) (0.0672) (0.0673) 
Previous Merger 0.4935** 0.4916** 0.4997** 0.5056** 0.5109* 
 (0.0767) (0.0766) (0.0765) (0.0770) (0.0769) 
Early New York Bank 0.7901* 0.9042** 0.9206** 0.8432** 0.9811** 
 (0.3139) (0.3236) (0.3224) (0.3156) (0.324) 
State-level Controls      
Highway at Founding 0.0030 -0.0085 -0.0090 -0.0122 -0.0082 
 (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0188) 
Unit Banking -1.318** -1.321** -1.330** -1.320** -1.3264* 
 (0.1340) (0.1342) (0.1342) (0.13445) (0.1345) 
Statewide Banking -0.3619** -0.3648** -0.3572** -0.3452** -0.3394* 
 (0.0888) (0.0889) (0.0889) (0.0890) (0.0892) 
Inter-state Banking -0.2345* -0.2346* -0.2313* -0.2262* -0.2239* 
 (0.1008) (0.1008) (0.1008) (0.1009) (0.1008) 
Per Capita Income -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Percent Urban 2.315 2.342 2.261 2.731 2.7333 
 (1.933) (1.933) (1.932) (1.955) (1.9552) 
Number Banks (t-1) -0.0015** -0.0014** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0015* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Average Bank Size (t-1) -0.3554** -0.3547** -0.3500** -0.3557** -0.3535* 
 (0.0822) (0.0823) (0.0822) (0.0835) (0.0835) 
Number of Mergers (t-1) 0.0134** 0.0134** 0.0134** 0.0134** 0.0134** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Constant -6.9726** -7.0209** -7.4601** -8.6689** -7.6514* 
 (2.374) (2.385) (2.395) (2.6526) (2.4696) 
Wald Chi Sq 695.26 4382.68 4595.11 4594.81 4611.43 
Observations 221921 221921 221921 219231 219231 
Number of Banks 24712 24712 24712 23797 23797 
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Statewide
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Figure 1: State Banking Laws, 1896, 1931, 1966 and 2001
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Figure 2: Number of Banks and Total Assets, 1978-2001
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Figure 3: Predicted Effects of Highways on Bank Size
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Figure 4: Predicted Effects of Highways on Branch Dispersion Figure 5: Relative Size of Banks in Three States, 1896-2001
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